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CASE NOTES

Finally, this further strengthening of the federal policy of disclosure maintains the balance between the private interest of the inventor in protection of
his investment and the public interest of the government in the enrichment of
the public domain. It also stabilizes the balance between the states' interest
in protection of contract and agency law and the federal interest in dissemination of knowledge and its use to the public. Kewanee attempts to strengthen
and clarify all these varied interests, while also re-enforcing their interdependent relationships.
MargaretGray Knodell

TORTS-Duty Of Care-Constructive Knowledge Of Defective
Condition Is Imposed Upon Landowner
State v. Tennison, 496 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. no writ).

Austin 1973,

Judyth Tennison, a state employee, was seriously injured when she slipped
and fell on an oily floor in a state-owned building. As a result, she underwent spinal surgery, and will require medical treatment for the rest of her
life. Since an employee of the state was negligent in his maintenance of
the floor, the issue of the case became what duty of care the state owed to
the plaintiff.
The Texas Tort Claims Act 1 provides that the state owes only that duty
of care which a landowner owes to a licensee on his land. The state argued
this to be a duty not to injure the plaintiff willfully, wantonly, or through
gross negligence. 2 The trial court, however, applied the standard of care
set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,3 concluding that if a licensor
1. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 18(b) (1970), states that "As to
premise defects, the upit of government shall owe to any claimant only the duty owed
by private persons to a licensee on private property .... "
2. See Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1950); Carlisle
v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 137 Tex. 220, 152 S.W.2d 1073 (1941); St. Clergy v. Northcutt,
448 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969, no writ); Mendez v. Knights of
Columbus Hall, 431 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, no writ); Chekanski
v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 306 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1957, writ ref'd
nr.e.).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342 (1965) which proposes that:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to licensees
by a condition on the land if, and only if,
(a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should

realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should
expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, and

(b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the premises safe, or to warn
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knows of a dangerous condition on his land, a duty arises to warn a licensee
or to make the condition reasonably safe. The defendant appealed, claiming lack of actual knowledge of the hazard.

HELD-Affirmed.

Where a

licensee is involved, constructive knowledge is sufficient to impose a standard
4
of ordinary care on a landowner.
The common law distinctions of invitees and licensees, and a landowner's

duty of care toward each, originated in England and were significantly
influenced by feudal concepts concerning the sanctity of land. 5 In a society where emphasis was placed on land ownership and possession, courts
were hesitant to impose liability on the upper class citizens for injuries sustained by entrants on the land even if the harm resulted from the landowner's

negligence. 6 Accompanying this notion of the sanctity of land was the related idea that economic benefit was to be gained only from the free use

and exploitation of realty.7 This economic aspect was emphasized further
during the 19th century by the demands of the landowning class for limitations on the scope of their liability. 8 Thus, in 1856, a court concluded that
the licensees of the condition and the risk involved, and
(c)the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and
the risk involved.
4. The court of appeals in State v. Tennison, 496 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1973, no writ) found that the employee who was responsible for the maintenance of the floor was charged with actual knowledge that a dangerous condition existed
due to his negligence, and thus the State was charged with constructive knowledge.
Id. at 222.
5. Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Toward Those Entering His Premises of
Their Own Right, 69 U. PA. L. REV. 237, 237-39 (1921); Marsh, The History and
Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers, 69 L.Q. REv. 182, 183-86

(1953).
6. The landowner was considered sovereign within the boundaries of his land
and therefore was allowed to do as he wished on or with his own domain. F. BOHLEN,
STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 163 (1926).
See generally Bohlen, The Duty of a
Landowner Toward Those Entering His Premises of Their Own Right, 69 U. PA. L.
REV. 237, 238-39 (1921); Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers, 69 L.Q. REV. 182, 183-86 (1953).
7. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1432 (1956); Note, Negligence
-Occupiers of Land, 3 SUFF. L. REV. 432, 433 (1969).

8. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The
lack of adequate transportation has also been cited as a reason for limiting a landowner's liability because of the sparseness of land settlements and the resulting inability of owners to inspect or maintain distant holdings. Id. at 101. The increasing
influence of the jury during the 19th century also contributed to the limitation on
the liability of owners and occupiers. The privileged position of the landowner was
taken for granted and juries, seldom comprised of the aristocracy, envisioned themselves injured in their roles as potential land visitors. Thus, Justice Williams held
as a matter of law that there was no negligence when an illiterate fell down the defendant's stairway, stating, "Every person who has any experience in courts of justice
knows very well that a case of this sort against a railway company could only be

submitted with one result." Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees,
Licensees, and Trespassers, 69 L.Q. REv. 182, 185-86 (1953), quoting Toomey v. Lon-

don, B. & S.C. Ry., 140 Eng. Rep. 694 (C.P. 1857). There was obviously a need
to alleviate the burden on the defendant and it proved easier to submit questions to
the jury by devising standards to be met by the occupier.
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a social guest was a mere licensee and the landowner was not obligated "to
make the place safe" for hin. 9 However, a division of opinion developed
as to who qualified as an invitee and a licensee and what standard of care
1
was to be extended to each. Indermaur v. Dames" established that invitees are persons who go upon land for business purposes in which both

the entrant and the landowner share an interest." Concurrently, it was
decided that if a place is held out as being public, there is an implied invitation to come upon the land, and the entrant has a right to expect the premises to be safe. 1 2

This "public invitation" led t6 an increased standard of

care for many landowners even though they received no direct benefit from
the plaintiff's visit.
Although these distinctions originated in England, American courts readily
adopted them as part of the common law. 3 It was discovered, however,4
that these classifications were too rigid and often led to inequitable results.1
9. Sideman v. Guttman, 330 N.Y.S.2d 263, 266 (Sup. Ct. 1972), citing Southcote
v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex. 1856). The plaintiff was classified as a social
guest because he was merely visiting the defendant hotel owner when he was injured
by a piece of falling glass.
Although the reason usually given for classifying a social guest as a mere licensee
is that the guest is expected to take the premises as he finds them, and that he should
not expect precautions to be taken that would give him better safety than members
of the owner's family, Dean Prosser wonders if this is in accord with present social
customs. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 379 (4th ed. 1971). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 330, comment h (1965).
10. L.R. I C.P. 274 (1866). Plaintiff, a gas-fitter, was injured while making repairs in defendant's sugar-refining factory.
11. Id.
12. Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573, 578 (1942), citing

Corby v. Hill, 140 Eng. Rep. 1209 (C.P. 1858). In Corby, the plaintiff was injured while
traveling on a road leading from the public highway to a public asylum in order to
visit the asylum's superintendent. The court found for the plaintiff claiming the defendants had induced him to travel on the road and consequently into a stack of slates
left on the unlighted road.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 330 (1965) defines a licensee as one
"privileged to enter or remain on land only by virtue of the possessor's consent."
Originallyi the only duty of care owed to a licensee was not to injure him willfully,
wantonly, or by gross negligence. See, e.g., Cudahy Packing Co. v. McBride, 92 F.2d
737 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 639 (1938). An invitee is either a "public invitee . . . invited to enter or remain on land as a member of the public" for
a public purpose, or a "business visitor . . . invited . . . for a purpose directly or

individually connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land." REA landowner owes an invitee a duty
OF TORTS § 332 (1965).
STATEMENT (SECOND)
to exercise ordinary care and prudence to keep the premises reasonably safe, and also
a duty to warn the invitee of all known dangers. See Prosser, Business Visitors and
Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573 (1942). The absence of business dealings generally
distinguishes a licensee from an invitee, and the element of consent distinguishes him
from a trespasser who "enters or remains upon land in possession of another
without a privilege to do so created by the possessor's consent or otherwise." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 329 (1965).
14. The dissatisfaction with the rigidity of the distinctions has been noted. Comment, Negligence-Occupiers of Land, 3 SUFF. L. REV. 432, 434 (1969), citing Dunster v. Abbott [1953] 2 All E. R. 1572 where Lord Denning stated:
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Consequently, a myriad of subclassifications developed which has produced an extremely complex system of determining a landowner's liability
toward entrants upon his land. 15 Various jurisdictions began to develop exceptions to the common law in cases involving "dangerous instrumentalities,"'1 "concealed traps,"' 7 and "active negligence.""' The doctrine of the

"attractive nuisance" was developed, imposing further liability on unforeseeing landowners.19
Because this type of patchwork theory was difficult to apply, it encouraged
courts to develop other exceptions to bypass inevitably harsh and inequitable
results. 20 Exceptions to the classifications have since become so readily

available that the firmness and consistency of the law are constantly being

challenged. 21

Because the subclassifications and distinctions are shadowy

A canvasser who comes on your premises without your consent is a trespasser.
Once he has your consent he is a licensee. Not until you do business with him
is he an invitee. Even when you have done business with him, it seems rather
strange that your duty towards him should be different when he comes up to your
door from what it is when he goes away.
Another result has been the expanding of the duty owed to licensees. Thus, the
court in Shaw v. Weigartz, 135 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Mich. Ct. App. 1965), quoting
Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 602, declared that the host owes the duty not to injure, by either
active or passive negligence, a guest whose presence is known. It also stated that
a host can not set a trap or pitfall, and that he must warn against, or remove harmful defects which the guest is not likely to discover for himself.
Also, several jurisdictions have reclassified the social guest as an invitee. Lunney
v. Post, 248 So. 2d 504 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1971); Alexander v. General Acc. Fire
& Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730, 732 (La. Ct. App. 1957); Preston v. Sleziak,
167 N.W.2d 477 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-557a (Supp.
1973).
15. See Note, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 675-77 (1969); Note, Torts, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV.
426, 427 (1969).
16. E.g., Beauchamp v. New York City Housing Auth., 240 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1963).
17. E.g., Warner v. Lieberman, 253 F.2d 99 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920
(1958).

18. E.g., Dillingham v. Smith-Douglass Co., 261 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1958); Bylling
v. Edwards, 14 Cal. Rptr. 760 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
19. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 388 (D. Mont. 1958), ajf'd, 270
F.2d 488 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 924 (1959); Banker v. McLaughlin, 146
Tex. 434, 208 S.W.2d 843 (1948).
20. In Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972) the court
stressed this viewpoint saying:
A further indication that the classifications have become increasingly difficult
to apply is that the current trend in modern tort law is a process of erosion
of the once sharply defined categories into "increasingly subtle verbal refinements,
... subclassifications among traditional common-law categories . . .[and] fine
graduations in the standards of care which the landowner owes to each."
There are two reasons for this: first, the harsh results produced by rigid classification cause courts to broaden certain classifications and expand the duties
owed; and second, this expansion has produced even further confusion and conflict and a toleration of exceptions which apply only to individual cases.
Id. at 103 (citations omitted).
21. In discussing the problems of the subclassification system, the court in Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639, 644 (Minn. 1972) opined:
While, admittedly, such a policy is better than a strict adherence to the classification system, it is unsatisfactory because it creates a rigid system which is at
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and indistinct, 22 it is often difficult to determine the landowner's duty or
liability. The courts have continued to create a maze of confusing exceptions to reach a desirable result rather than to abrogate the rigid distinctions
of the common law.2 3 In 1957, however, the United States Supreme Court
in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transallantique 24 recognized that a
trend toward a uniform duty of due care might abate the complexity of determining liability:
[T]he classification and subclassifications bred by the common law
have produced confusion and conflict. As new distinctions have been
spawned, older ones have become obscured. Through this semantic
morass the common law has moved, unevenly and with hesitation, toand occupiers a single duty of reasonable
wards "imposing on owners
25

care in all circumstances."
Additionally, considerations of humanity, equity, and logic have inspired

this current movement toward the abandonment of the common law distinctions and the varying liability of landowners. 26 An increasing regard for
human safety has also led to a realization of the inequalities existing in the
present ambiguity-ridden system:

A man's life or limb does not become less worthy of protection by the
the same time complex, confusing, inequitable, and, paradoxically, nonuniform.

Today, there are so many exceptions that it is nearly impossible to record all of
them.
22. Alexander v. General Acc. Fire & Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730, 733 (La.
Ct. App. 1957).
23. See Note, Negligence-Occupiersof Land, 3 SUFF. L. REV. 432, 437 (1969).
24. 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
25. Id. at 631.
26. In Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court
discusses the distinctions:
The realities of modem life teach us that these labels are today irrelevant to
the jury's task. Personal status no longer depends on one's relation to real property. With urbanized society comes closer living conditions and a more gregarious population. The trespasser who steps from a public sidewalk onto a private
parking lot today is not the "outlaw" or "poacher" whose entry was both unanticipated and resented in the nineteenth century. It is contrary to reason to accept as a settled principle of law that a parking lot owner actually varies his conduct according to the status of those who walk across his boundaries.
Id. at 102-03 (citations omitted).
Legal authorities are almost unanimously in accord in their criticism of the common
law distinctions, feeling that they are the product of a forgotten era and finding
very few reasons for continuing to adhere to its principles. See Smith v. Arbaugh's
Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97 (1968); F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 163 (1926); 2 F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS 1430, 1432 (1956); Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner
Towards Those Entering His Premises of Their Own Right, 69 U. PA. L. REV. 142
(1921); Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 1, 5 (1971); Marsh,
The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers, 69 L.Q.
REV. 182, 359 (1953); Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573
(1942); Comment, The Outmoded Distinction Between Licensees and Invitees, 22 Mo.
L. REV. 186 (1957); Note, Torts-Liability to Social Guests, 33 ALBANY L. REV. 230
(1968); Note, 23 ARK. L. REV. 153 (1969); Note, Negligence, 47 J. URBAN L. 203
(1969); Note, Negligence-Occupiers of Land, 3 SUFF. L. REv. 432 (1969).
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. because he has come upon the land of another without per-

mission or with permission but without a business purpose. Reasonable

people do not ordinarily vary their conduct depending upon such matters, and to focus upon the status of the injured party . . in order to

determine the question whether the landowner has a duty of care, is
contrary to our modem social mores and humanitarian values.

The

common law rules obscure rather than illuminate the proper consider27
ations which should govern determination of the question of duty.
Presently, Texas does not adhere to the trend espoused by Kermarek and

the California decision of Rowland v. Christian.2 8

Texas courts have held

that the duty which a landowner owes to an invitee, expressed or implied,2 9
is a duty to use ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe con-

dition" ° and to give adequate and timely notice and warning of concealed or
latent perils known to him but unknown to the entrant.3 1 If the entrant

is a licensee, however, the only duty is not to injure him willfully, wantonly,
or through gross negligence. 32 To this general rule, Texas has added an exception that if a licensor has knowledge of a dangerous condition, and the
licensee does not, a duty arises on the part of the licensor to warn or make

the condition reasonably safe. 33

27. Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968) (emphasis added). It does
not require any more effort to prepare one's premises for a social guest or a licensee
than it does for a business invitee. To allow the business visitor the "luxury" of ordinary care without affording a social guest the same protection is without legal logic.
As one critic pointed out:
It is customary for possessors to prepare as carefully, if not more carefully, for
social guests as for business guests; furthermore, the social guest has reasons to
believe that his host will either make conditions on the premises safe or at least
warn of hidden danagers.
McCleary, The Liability of A Possessor of Land in Missouri to Persons Injured While
on the Land, 1 Mo. L. REv. 45, 58 (1936).
28. 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
29. Generally, it has been held that to claim the status of an implied invitee,
it must appear that the purpose for going on premises owned by another, or under
the control of another, was for the benefit of the owner. Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis,
149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1950); Taylor v. Fort Worth Poultry & Egg Co., 112
S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1937, writ dism'd); Kruse v. Houston &
T.C.R.R., 253 S.W. 623 (Tex. Civ. App-Galveston 1923, no writ); Shawver v. American Ry. Express Co., 236 S.W. 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1921, writ ref'd). This
rule, however, has been relaxed. In Carlisle v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 137 Tex. 220,
223, 152 .SW.2d 1073, 1075 (1941), the'court said the essential factor was whether
the premises were public or private. See Kallum v. Wheeler, 129 Tex. 74, 101 S.W.2d
225 (1937).
30. Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1950); WalgreenTexas Co. v. Shivers, 137 Tex. 493, 154 S.W.2d 625 (1941); Carlisle v. J. Weingarten,
Inc., 137 Tex. 220, 152 S.W.2d 1073 (1941); Kallum v. Wheeler, 129 Tex. 74, 101
S.W.2d 225 (1937).
/
31. Triangle Motors v. Richmond, 152 Tex. 354, 258 S.W.2d 60 (1953); Gulf
Prod. Co. v. Quisenberry, 128 Tex. 347, 97 S.W.2d 166 (1936).
32. Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 516, 235 S.W.2d 609, 615 (1950);
Carlisle v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 137 Tex. 220, 221, 152 S.W.2d 1073, 1074 (1941);
Dobbins v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 91 Tex. 60, 41 S.W. 62 (1897); Galveston Oil
Co. v. Morton, 70 Tex. 400, 404, 7 S.W. 756, 757 (1888).
33. Gulf Ref. Co. v. Beane, 133 Tex. 157, 127 S.W.2d 169 (1937) (unguarded
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This was the status of the law when Judyth Tennison was injured and the
Austin Court of Civil Appeals declared that constructive knowledge was sufficient to impose a duty of ordinary care toward a licensee. 34 Constructive

knowledge has been defined as that knowledge which "could be acquired
by the exercise of ordinary care . . . ,,13Thus, the court seems to be requiring that a landowner should exercise a duty of ordinary care so that he

might have real or constructive knowledge of dangerous conditions on his
premises. If he has such knowledge, either real or constructive, he is under
a duty of ordinary care to make the premises safe or to warn the licensee
of the danger, which is the same standard of care which a landowner owes
to an invitee. Although the decision did not directly condone an abrogation

of the common law distinctions, it appears that the court came remarkably
close to adopting a uniform standard of ordinary care with regard to the

liability of landowners to entrants upon their land.
Several jurisdictions have repealed the common law distinctions and established a uniform standard of ordinary care in their place. It is ironic, though
significant, that the first jurisdiction to abolish the classifications was England.3 6 Two years later a revolutionary step was taken by the United
States Supreme Court in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique37 where the Court refused to apply the common law distinctions to

admiralty law, claiming that the common law presently favors a duty of or38
dinary care in all circumstances.
hole on filling station premises); Gonzalez v. Broussard, 274 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (rocks on theatre playground); TexasLouisiana Power Co. v. Webster, 59 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1933), aff'd
127 Tex. 126, 91 S.W.2d 302, 306 (1936) (dangerous condition of power line). RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 342(a) (1965) suggests the defendant must not
only have actual knowledge of the condition, but actual realization of the danger it
involves.
34. State v. Tennison, 496 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), no
writ).
35. Ebersole v. Sapp, 208 S.W. 156, 157 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919, opinion
adopted).
36. Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968), citing The Occupier's Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, C. 31 (1957); see Payne, The Occupier's Liability Act, 21
MODERN L. REV. 359 (1958). See also J. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW
OF ToRTs 81 (1967), where he comments:
Mounting irritation with the exceeding complexity, fragmentation, and even
occasional capriciousness of the common law, combined with a lessening sense of
the need to protect occupiers against the exactations of the general negligence
standard (especially now that the civil jury had virtually disappeared from the
scene) eventually prompted the passage in 1957 of the Occupiers Liability Act,
with the avowed aim of admitting occupiers to full membership in the family
of those acknowledging allegiance to the "neighbourly" obligation of reasonable
care.
37. 358 U.S. 625 (1959). The plaintiff went aboard the S.S. Oregon to visit a
crew member and, while leaving, fell down a stairway. He based his cause of action
on the negligence of the crew in affixing a canvas runner to the stairway.
38. Id. at 631.
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In 1968, the California Supreme Court adopted a single standard of due
care under the circumstances in Rowland v. Christian9 which has been the
most far-reaching and influential decision regarding the abrogation of the
common law standards. 40 The plaintiff, a social guest, was injured by a
damaged faucet handle in the defendant's lavatory. Although the defendant knew of the faulty condition, he never warned the plaintiff of the danger.
The court discarded the common law distinctions and applied the general
doctrine of negligence embodied in California's civil code, 41 and further provided that "[tihe proper test to be applied . . . is whether in the manage-

ment of his property [the owner or occupier] has acted as a reasonable man
in view of the probability of injury to others .

-"42

The decisions in these cases have produced a rational approach in determining landowners' liability for harm done to entrants upon their land, and
results have been favorable in the cases following the new standards. 43 One
39. 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
40. Rowland was first followed by Hawaii which abolished the distinctions in
Pickard v. Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445 (Hawaii 1969). In Pickard, the plaintiff fell
through a hole in the courthouse's unlighted restroom, and the court concluded that
a landowner or occupier has a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of persons reasonably expected to be upon the premises, regardless of the status of the individual. In Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1971), the Colorado
Supreme Court reasoned that although the status of the injured person might be considered by the fact finders, the principal issue would be whether the owner acted in a
reasonable manner in view of the probability of injury to persons entering upon the
property. Accord, Smith v. Mill Creek Court, Inc., 457 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1972).
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1972),
was next to adopt a standard of ordinary care after a young girl was killed in her
sleep by gas from a leaking refrigerator. Accord, Krengel v. Midwest Automatic
Photo, Inc., 203 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. 1973).. The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia also rejected the common law distinctions in Smith v., Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972) and supplied excellent guidelines to aid the
jury in its determination of reasonable conduct. These included the likelihood that
the owner's conduct will cause injury, the seriousness of the injury if it occurs, and
balanced against the interest which the landowner must sacrifice to avoid the risk or
dangerous condition. Id. at 105.
41. CAL- Civ. CoDE § 1714 (Deering 1971) provides that:
Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for
an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or
by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.
42. Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968). Accord, Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Brown v. Merlo, 106 Cal. Rptr.
388 (1973); Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1972); Mile High
Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1971); Pickard v. Honolulu, 452 P.2d
445 (Hawaii 1969); Rosenau v. City of Estherville, 199 N.W.2d 125 (Iowa 1972);
Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1972). Contra, Epling v. United States,
453 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1971); Robles v. Severyn, 504 P.2d 1284 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973);
Werth v. Ashley Realty Co., 199 N.W.2d 899, 907 (N.D. 1972).
43. See Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 908 (Supp. 1972) where
the fact that a college student was illegally unscrewing a street lamp when he was
electrocuted was one of several factors to be weighed in determining liability when
it was discovered that the defendant knew that the' unscrewing of the lights was a
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case which particularly demonstrates the equities achieved by the use of a
single standard of ordinary care as to licensees and invitees is Hurst v.
Crowtero Boating Club, Inc.44 Defendant, a boating club, maintained a
boat ramp and dock for the purpose of loading and unloading its members'
boats. A "no swimming" sign had been located in the immediate area, but
it had been missing for several months with no apparent effort by the club to
replace it. Several members of the defendant club noticed the plaintiff and
his friend swimming in the dock area, but no one bothered to warn them
of the danger or to insure that the drivers of incoming boats saw the boys.
Plaintiff was seriously injured when he was struck by a boat. Although the
trial court found for the defendant, a Colorado Court of Appeals reversed,
noting that the jury had been instructed incorrectly. 4I The status of the
plaintiff as licensee, which barred his recovery in the trial court, was just
one factor to be considered, and not conclusive of the liability of the defendant. 46 The new standard of due care prevented a great injustice, since
defendant knew of the danger yet failed to replace the warning sign or caution the boys about swimming in the area.
The rationale is further revealed by examining Gould v. DeBeve, 47 decided in 1964, in which a 2-year-old "trespasser" fell out of a loosely
screened window. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia failed
to change the test of liability, but found in favor of the child claiming that
his presence was foreseeable. 48 This merely created another subclassification, that of the foreseeability of 2-year-olds falling out loosely screened
windows. Today this court could apply the standards established in Smith
v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc.49 and might easily reach the same decision by
weighing the foreseeability of injury and the likely seriousness of the injury
against the inconvenience of the owner in amending the dangerous condition. This is a more equitable, less confusing method of determining liability than adherence to the subclassification system.
Other jurisdictions have either partially abrogated the distinctions or have
frequent occurrence. In Titan Constr. Co. v. Nolf, 500 P.2d 377 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972)
an employer was held liable because he failed to use reasonable care in providing
an employee with a safe place to work, and in Minoletti v. Sabini, 103 Cal. Rptr.
528 (Cal. App. 1972), whether a landlord had violated his duty of care to a lessee
when he failed to properly repair a window was held to be a question for the jury.
44. 496 P.2d 1054 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
45. Id. at 1055. The trial court had instructed that the duty owed to a licensee
is "not to injure him by a wilful or wanton act or by an affirmative act of negligence."
The Colorado Supreme Court, however, had abolished this strict adherence to the classification system and had established a uniform duty of ordinary care in Mile High
Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1971).
46. Id. at 1055.
47. 330 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
48. Id. at 830.
49. 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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expressed a desire to do so.50 In 1955, the Supreme Court of Missouri emphasized its reluctance to depend completely on the classification system, 51
52
and four other states have declared that a social guest is an invitee.
Courts in New York,5 3 Iowa, 54 and Washington 55 have also expressed discontent with the common law distinctions.
State v. Tennison" provides the Supreme Court of Texas with an excellent opportunity to reject the common law distinctions of invitee and licensee
as the main criterion for recovery and to adopt a uniform standard of ordinary care. To the general rule that the only duty owed to a licensee is not

to injure him willfully, wantonly, or through gross negligence, 57 Texas courts
have added the exception that if a "licensor has knowledge of a dangerous
condition, and the licensee does not, a duty arises on the part of the licensor to

50. Dean Prosser notes that this system has incurred the displeasure of legal writers, several courts, and has started on its way to complete disregard. W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 58, at 357 (4th ed. 1971).
In Louisville Trust Co. v. Nutting, 437 S.W.2d 484 (Ky. 1968), Kentucky may have
abrogated the distinctions, but because it involved a child, the court's position can
not yet be accurately determined.
States which have refused to adopt the Rowland doctrine and abolish the distinctions
include Arizona, Mississippi, North Dakota, Ohio, and thus far, Texas. Robles v.
Severyn, 504 P.2d 1284 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973); Astleford v. Milner Enterprises, Inc.,
233 So. 2d 524 (Miss. 1970); Werth v. Ashley Realty Co., 199 N.W.2d 899 (N.D.
1972); DiGildo v. Caponi, 247 N.E.2d 732 (Ohio 1969); Buchholz v. Steitz, 463
S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
51. Wolfson v. Chelist, 284 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1955). The court remarked:
[W]e have not considered the classification . . . so inflexible as to preclude recovery where the facts merit an exception. In treating with cases where economic
or social conditions create new and sound humanitarian bases for invoking a duty
to take precautionary measures over and beyond those imposed upon an occupier
in a particular occupier-entrant relationship, we think we have not and we trust
we shall not too rigidly apply the law applicable to the entrant's legal status.
Id. at 451.
52. Cases cited note 13 supra. In addition, Ohio has created a special category
for social guests. As the court said in Scheibel v. Lipton, 102 N.E.2d 453, 462 (Ohio
1951):
A reasonable solution of the difficulty of forcing social guests into any one of
the three molds commonly recognized, to wit, trespasser, licensee or invitee, is
solved by ceasing such effort and merely considering and discussing social guests
as social guests and by referring to the one owing the duty and obligation to the
guest as the host.
53. Sideman v. Guttman, 330 N.Y.S. 263, 266 (Sup. Ct. 1972) where the court
stressed:
[T]he judge-made rule that a social guest is a licensee who must take the premises
as he finds them and is entitled to no greater protection than that owing to a member
of the owner's family has no basis in logic and should no longer be accorded any
legal validity.
54. Rosenau v. City of Estherville, 199 N.W.2d 125, 136 (Iowa 1972); Ives v.
Swift & Co., 183 N.W.2d 172, 178 (Iowa 1971) (concurring opinion).
55. Potts v. Amis, 384 P..2d 825 (Wash. 1963), citing Sherman v. Seattle, 356
P.2d 316 (Wash. 1960).
56. 496 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, no writ).
57. Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1950); Carlisle v.
J. Weingarten, Inc., 137 Tex. 220, 152 S.W.2d 1073 (1941).
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warn or make the condition reasonably safe."'58 Tennison has now expanded
the exception to include constructive knowledge. 59 It is believed that eventually the totality of the exceptions will themselves create a uniform standard of ordinary care, but one so complicated that its application will be
confusing, irrational, and ambiguous. A declaration of a standard duty of
care would eliminate the confusion and allow the courts a readily workable
solution.60

The major fear concerning the adoption of a standard duty of ordinary
care is that not only will litigation greatly increase, but also that an abundance of plaintiff-verdicts will occur. This, however, seems to be an unfounded complaint.

First, it is extremely doubtful that many legitimate

claims have been abandoned because the injured party realized he was a
licensee and not entitled to due care. Secondly, the standard of ordinary
care is the identical standard used in other tort injury cases where the status
of the plaintiff is not in issue. 61 It does not seem logical, in view of the ac-

ceptability of this standard, that a preponderance of plaintiff-verdicts would
occur just in cases involving owners and occupiers of land. Thirdly, the
jury usually has done a more than adequate job in determining the actions
62
of reasonable men, and it is probable that they will continue to do so.

58. Gonzalez v. Broussard, 274 S.W.2d 737, 738-39 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (emphasis added).
59. State v. Tennison, 496 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, no
writ).
60. In Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1968) it was said:
There is another fundamental objection to the approach to the question of the
possessor's liability on the basis of the common law distinctions based upon the
status of the injured party as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee. Complexity can be
borne and confusion remedied where the underlying principles governing liability
are based upon proper considerations. Whatever may have been the historical
justifications for the common law distinctions, it is clear that those distinctions
are not justified in the light of our modem society and that the complexity and
confusion which has arisen is not due to difficulty in applying the original common law rules-they are all too easy to apply in their original formulation-but
is due to the attempts to apply just rules in our modern society within the ancient
terminology..
61. The court, in Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, 469 F.2d 97, 106 n.48 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), stressed the fact that the elements of negligence must be established before
a plaintiff will be allowed to recover. This emphasizes the idea that just because
an entrant is injured on a landowner's premises, does not mean that the owner will
be automatically held liable.
62. For instance, in Kaffel v. Cloverleaf Kennel Club, 504 P.2d 374 (Colo. Ct. App.
1972), the plaintiff, a business invitee, was injured at a race track when a keg of
beer fell off a cart in a passageway. Judgment was rendered for the defendant with
the jury finding that its employee acted in a reasonable, prudent manner in view of
the probability of injuries which can be foreseen by a reasonably prudent man. The
court added:
One is bound to anticipate and provide against what usually happens, and what
is likely to happen; but it would impose too heavy a responsibility to hold him
bound in like manner to guard against what is unusual and unlikely to happen, or
what, as it is sometimes said, is only remotely and slightly probable.
Id. at 375-76. In Rodrick v. J.C. Penney Co., 505 P.2d 973 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973),
a defendant department store was found not to be liable when a 3-year-old caught
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A less potent argument against establishing a standard duty of ordinary
care is the fear of a financial disaster occurring to the landowner. 63 Low
64
cost liability insurance is readily available for landowners and occupiers.
Further, once the injury is sustained, the expenses are just as costly to the
injured party as they would be to the landowner, so placing the cost with
the negligent party will not only encourage the prevention of accidents but
will also give an incentive for the safe maintenance of property.6 5
It has been stated that only the legislature has the authority to change
such a firmly established rule. 66 This is, however, court-made law and the
courts do have the power, indeed the duty, to overrule stare decisis when a
legal concept has outdated its purpose. 67 As Justice Sutherland declared for
the Supreme Court in his opinion in Funk v. United States:6
[I]f Congress fail to act . . . and the court be called upon to decide
the question, is it not the duty of the court . . . to decide it in accordance with present-day standards of wisdom and justice rather than in

accordance with some outworn and antiquated rule of the past.6 9
By adopting the standards emphasized by the decisions in other jurisdic-

tions, 70 the jury in Texas would be able to consider the foreseeability of the

possible harm, 71 the seriousness of the injury should it occur, and balance

his fingers in an escalator skirt,' and in Trevino v. Hirsch, 492 P.2d 899 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1971), the defendant was said to have acted in a prudent manner even though
a 2-year-old child was badly burned from a gas fire. These examples illustrate that
the jury will continue to investigate the actions of a reasonable man with care as
it is done in other negligence cases.
63. See Comment, Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., and the Invitee-LicenseeTrespasser Distinction, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 383-84 (1972).
64. See James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees
and Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605, 612 (1954).
65. See Comment, Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., and the Invitee-LicenseeTrespasser Distinction, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 383 (1972). The insurance question
was mentioned in Rowland v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), and the court concluded that insurance is easily obtained, and even if the rates did increase, the rise
would be slight or negligible. Id. at 103-4. This slight increase in insurance premiums can easily be justified when human safety and well-being are concerned.
For an opposing viewpoint on the allocation of costs, see Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 107-8 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (concurring opinion).
66. See State v. Tennison, 496 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973,
no writ) (dissenting opinion); Buchholz v. Steitz, 463 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
67. Common law classifications are judicial creations capable of being cast aside
by judicial action when their purpose is no longer served. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d
29, 44 (1952).
68. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
69. Id. at 382.
70. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Rowland
v. Christian, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308
(Colo. 1971 ).
71. Wigmore lists four kinds of circumstances (events or things) which may point
to the probability that a defendant had knowledge of a condition:
(1) the direct exposure of the fact to his senses;
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